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By Joseph Landry and Udi Shamir
Update, 14-July: There have been a number of stories published since the posting of this blog that have suggested this attack is specifically targeting SCADA energy management systems. We want to emphasize that we do not have any evidence that this is in fact the case. The focus of our analysis was on the characteristics of the malware, not the attribution or target.
The Labs team at SentinelOne recently discovered a sophisticated malware campaign specifically targeting at least one energy company. Upon discovery, the team reverse engineered the code and believes that based on the nature, behavior and sophistication of the malware and the extreme measures it takes to evade detection, it likely points to a nation-state sponsored initiative, potentially originating in Eastern Europe.
The malware is most likely a dropper tool being used to gain access to carefully targeted network users, which is then used either to introduce the payload, which could either work to extract data or insert the malware to potentially shut down an energy grid. The exploit affects all versions of Microsoft Windows and has been developed to bypass traditional antivirus solutions, next-generation firewalls, and even more recent endpoint solutions that use sandboxing techniques to detect advanced malware. (biometric readers are non-relevant to the bypass / detection techniques, the malware will stop executing if it detects the presence of specific biometric vendor software).
We believe the malware was released in May of this year and is still active. It exhibits traits seen in previous nation-state Rootkits, and appears to have been designed by multiple developers with high-level skills and access to considerable resources.
We validated this malware campaign against SentinelOne and confirmed the steps outlined below were detected by our Dynamic Behavior Tracking (DBT) engine.
Malware Synopsis
This sample was written in a manner to evade static and behavioral detection. Many anti-sandboxing techniques are utilized. Analysts relying solely on sandbox solutions may miss the full functionality of the sample.
Update: JoeSandbox contacted us and said their sandbox will run this sample.
Two known exploits (CVE-2014-4113 and CVE-2015-1701) were found in the sample, as well as one UAC bypass.
The sample appears to be targeting facilities that not only have software security in place, but physical security as well. ZKTeco (http://www.zkteco.com/) is a global manufacturer of access control systems including facial recognition, fingerprint scanners, and RFID. If the sample is run on a workstation with ZKTeco’s ZKAccess software installed, the process will prematurely terminate. These systems would be heavily scrutinized by their administrators, and an infection on one of these machines would likely not go unnoticed.
Two hard coded MAC addresses are checked for by the sample. A MAC address is unique 6-byte number that is burned into the chips of all network cards. The sample will prematurely terminate if the machine it is running on has one of these two MAC addresses.
Use of low-level API (Nt* and Rtl*) and direct system calls (INT 2Eh and CALL ntdll!KiFastSystemCall)
were used to bypass user-space hooks used by antivirus software and sandboxes. This also demonstrates the expertise of the author. Many of these low-level APIs and system calls are undocumented/under-documented and can change between different versions of Windows. To gain an understanding of these functions, one has to be familiar with the Windows Driver Development Kit (DDK), and also reverse-engineered portions of the Windows operating system.
The use of indirect subroutine calls make manual static analysis nearly impossible, and manual dynamic analysis painful and slow. The author took special care to keep this sample undetected for as long as possible.
The main goal of the sample analyzed is to run its final payload after silently removing a number of antivirus products.
Overview of Execution
The sample starts by rigorously checking its environment. If in a sandbox or under manual inspection by an analyst, the sample will prematurely terminate. If the sample finds specific antivirus software installed, it will carefully enable and disable specific functionality to evade behavioral detection.
In many situations, the sample will distance itself from malicious behaviors by
invoking cmd.exe to do its dirty work. For example, modifying sensitive registry values are done by invoking cmd.exe /c reg.exe …. Unfortunately for this sample, SentinelOne tracks the full context of processes to determine the root cause of malicious behavior.
From this point on, the sample’s goal is to remove any antivirus software before running its final payload. To accomplish this goal, the sample must be run as administrator. Two known local privilege escalation exploits are included in the sample (CVE-2014- 4113 and CVE-2015-1701), as well as one UAC bypass, which are used to acquire administrator access. As a last resort, the sample will use a UAC prompt to try and elevate itself to administrator. Once the sample is running as administrator, it will add the current user to the local Administrator group, allowing it to maintain administrator access in the future.
The sample now writes its Native Application binary to disk. Unlike regular application code, this binary can only link to ntdll.dll. It will run at a point in the boot-up process where some Windows subsystems are not yet initialized, and therefore can not call into normal dlls like kernel32.dll and user32.dll. This Native Application is hidden in an NTFS Alternative Data Stream (ADS) at the path C:\Windows\Temp:1. By using ADS, the file will not be visible by normal file browsers, like explorer.exe. The Native Application is registered to run on boot-up altering the values SetupExecute and BootExecute in the registry key HKLM\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\Session Manager\\.
To ensure the success of the Native Application, the sample will remove all filter drivers from running after reboot by removing their associated registry entries. Filter drivers are use by anti-virus software to intercept file and network access to run static detection on the contents of the traffic. These drivers are loaded early in the boot process, and could interfere with the execution of the Native Application.
The system is now forced to reboot, allowing the Native Application to run. The Native Application also has similar checks to tell if it is running in a sandbox, and will terminate prematurely when one is detected.
The Native Application’s goal is to remove any anti-virus software that is installed on the system and drop its final payload. By running during the boot process, and after the preperation that was done in the previous stage, the Native Application has full control over the system. Removing any anti-virus is trivial at this point because the anti-virus software is not running. The Native Binary writes the final payload of the sample to disk under the filename rdpinst.exe and registers it to be run later in the boot process by creating a registry value in\Registry\Machine\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce.
Architecture
There is one large structure that is allocated on the heap. This structure contains mostly function pointers to external libraries and internal function pointers. This creates a problem for static analysis. There are many indirect calls (e.g. CALL EAX) obscuring the program flow for static analysis. This structure is passed as the first parameter to almost every function in the binary.
A large chunk of the .data region is encrypted using RC4. This encrypted region contains the string literals for the sample, creating another problem for static analysis and static detection. Before the process is terminated, this region is re-encrypted, possibly to deter an analyst from recovering the unencrypted contents by using memory dumps.
Included in this encrypted region are three binary blobs that are also encrypted and compressed: final payload, a Windows Native API application; A DLL with a UAC bypass; and a 64-bit executable an exploit for CVE-2014-4113.
Reversing Techniques Used
To reverse the main sample, I developed a python script to patch out the blacklist and NOP out some test code. By placing a breakpoint on the function that gets called to prematurely terminate the process, we were able to identify checks that failed by inspecting the return address on the call stack.
Zeroing out the relocation size in the PE Data Directory also made jumping between IDA and OllyDBG easier because the base address of the executable was not randomized.
Noting the destination address of indirect jumps in IDA comments made reviewing after debugging much simpler.
To debug the Native Application binary, I patched the PE Optional Header field Subsystem field from 1 to 2. This changed the subsystem used by the binary from Native to WindowsGUI. This will let the binary run after bootup is finished, instead of getting this error message:
“Packing”
The code of the main executable (.text segment) isn’t packed, but a region in the .data section is encrypted using RC4 with the password “dqrChZonUF”. The RC4 implementation looks like a direct copy of the code found in the FreeBSD and XNU kernel:
- https://github.com/freebsd/freebsd/blob/master/sys/crypto/rc4/rc4.c
- http://opensource.apple.com//source/xnu/xnu-1456.1.26/bsd/crypto/rc4/rc4.c
The only modification to the BSD RC4 implementation is the pointer to the global struct containing the function pointers to the RC4 subroutines.
After decrypting this large section, all the string literals are uncovered.
Also, there are other regions inside of this decrypted region containing more encrypted blobs, like a Matryoshka doll. These contain a Native executable, the UAC bypass DLL, and the 64-bit implementation of the exploit for CVE-2014-4113. Furthermore, the Native binary contains another binary blob, that is the compressed and encrypted final payload.
Team member, Caleb Fenton, correctly identified the compressed stream format used for these blobs as aPLib.
Although RC4 isn’t an esoteric stream cipher, the decision by the author to use such a cipher shows a level of sophistication not seen in typical crimeware.
Anti-Debug, Anti-Sandbox, Anti-AV
The sample has an overwhelming number of checks to determine if it is in a sandbox, or if an antivirus application is installed. But why would the author go through so much trouble to evade sandboxes and AV products?
The strategy used by the author seems to be this:
- If we are running in a virtual machine, sandbox, or under manual inspection by an analyst, encrypt the .data section and terminate prematurely.
- If we are in an environment with Anti-Virus products installed, carefully enable and disable behaviors of the infection to avoid behavioral detection.
The following is a list of checks the sample performs in the order that they are executed.
CPUID Check
This test is the least invasive of all the tests performed. It also would be hard for a virtualization-based sandbox to detect, because the CPUID instruction would be run on the physical CPU, and can’t be hooked.By running this test first, it will insure that the sandbox log would not show any evidence of the process trying to inspect its environment. An analyst might dismiss the sample, because it doesn’t appear to be trying to detect the sandbox or virtual machine.The x86 instruction CPUID will report back features of the CPU. This instruction is normally used to check what features are supported by the CPU to avoid an “Invalid Instruction” exception before executing feature specific code. The sample uses this instruction to find artifacts of a virtual machine.When the CPUID instruction is executed and the register EAX set to 0x80000002, 0x80000003, or 0x80000004, the CPU fills registers EAX, EBX, ECX, and EDX with the “Product Brand String.” If the brand string is found in the sample’s blacklist, the process will prematurely terminate.
Strings check by CPUID where EAX=0x8000000x:
Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU
Common KVM processor
Common 32-bit KVM
Virtual CPU
Intel Celeron_4x0 (Conroe/Merom Class Core 2)
Westmere E56xx/L56xx/X56xx (Nehalem-C)
Intel Core 2 Duo P9xxx (Penryn Class Core 2)
Intel Core i7 9xx (Nehalem Class Core i7)
Intel Xeon E312xx (Sandy Bridge)
AMD Opteron 240 (Gen 1 Class Opteron)
AMD Opteron 22xx (Gen 2 Class Opteron)
AMD Opteron 23xx (Gen 3 Class Opteron)
AMD Opteron 62xx class CPU
Intel CPU version
Many of these CPU strings look legitimate, but are the exact strings used by KVM and QEMU.
# kvm -cpu ?
x86 qemu64 QEMU Virtual CPU version 2.4.0
x86 phenom AMD Phenom(tm) 9550 Quad-Core Processor
x86 core2duo Intel(R) Core(TM)2 Duo CPU T7700 @ 2.40GHz
x86 kvm64 Common KVM processor
x86 qemu32 QEMU Virtual CPU version 2.4.0
x86 kvm32 Common 32-bit KVM processor
x86 coreduo Genuine Intel(R) CPU T2600 @ 2.16GHz
x86 486
x86 pentium
x86 pentium2
x86 pentium3
x86 athlon QEMU Virtual CPU version 2.4.0
x86 n270 Intel(R) Atom(TM) CPU N270 @ 1.60GHz
x86 Conroe Intel Celeron_4x0 (Conroe/Merom Class Core 2)
x86 Penryn Intel Core 2 Duo P9xxx (Penryn Class Core 2)
x86 Nehalem Intel Core i7 9xx (Nehalem Class Core i7)
x86 Westmere Westmere E56xx/L56xx/X56xx (Nehalem-C)
x86 SandyBridge Intel Xeon E312xx (Sandy Bridge)
x86 IvyBridge Intel Xeon E3-12xx v2 (Ivy Bridge)
x86 Haswell-noTSX Intel Core Processor (Haswell, no TSX)
x86 Haswell Intel Core Processor (Haswell)
x86 Broadwell-noTSX Intel Core Processor (Broadwell, no TSX)
x86 Broadwell Intel Core Processor (Broadwell)
x86 Opteron_G1 AMD Opteron 240 (Gen 1 Class Opteron)
x86 Opteron_G2 AMD Opteron 22xx (Gen 2 Class Opteron)
x86 Opteron_G3 AMD Opteron 23xx (Gen 3 Class Opteron)
x86 Opteron_G4 AMD Opteron 62xx class CPU
x86 Opteron_G5 AMD Opteron 63xx class CPU
x86 host KVM processor with all supported host features (only available in KVM mode)
If the check passes, the string is stored in the global struct for later testing.
Furthermore, the CPUID instruction can be executed with the register EAX set to 0x40000000. This will return a string that can be set by a hypervisor.
Blacklist for CPUID where EAX=0x40000000:
VMwareVMware
XenVMMXenVMM
KVMKVMKVM
prl hyperv
Microsoft Hv
More about the CPUID can be found in the Intel Instruction Set Reference starting on page 3-179: http://www.intel.com/content/dam/www/public/us/en/documents/manuals/64-ia-32-architectures-software-developer-instruction-set-reference-manual-325383.pdf
Hostname Check
The sample contains a blacklist of hostnames. In the event the result of GetComputerNameW() is found in the blacklist, again, the process terminates.
brbrb-d8fb22af1
jonathan-c561e0
avreview1-VMXP
vwinxp-maltest
avreview-VMSunbox
infected-system
Googling these strings brings results that suggest that they are hostnames for sandboxes and honeypots. These hostnames are also used in other malware samples as hostname blacklists.
Filename Check
By a call to GetModuleFileNameW() the sample check its filename to see if it is in a location commonly used by sandboxes:
Full string case insensitive compare:
C:\xxx\sample.exe
C:\sample.exe
C:\Shared\dum._vxe
C:\SniferFiles\sample.exe
C:\virus\virus.exe
C:\virus.exe
c:\sampel.exe
C:\setup.exe
C:\runme.exe
c:\VMRun\Zample.exe
c:\FILE.EXE
C:\run\temp.exe
c:\taskrun\samples\rtktst.exe.exe
c:\artifact.exe
C:\manual\sunbox.exe
C:\1.exe
String find:
malware.exe
\virus\
admin\downloads\samp1e_
sample_execution
mlwr_smpl.exe
Any file in this format where ‘x’ is any character.
'xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx\\xxxxxxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxx-xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx'
This format apears to be a GUID string. There must be some sandboxing technology that uses this format that the author was aware of.
Finally, it checks if a ‘Z:\’ drive is present, then checks for the file ‘Z:\VxStream’. This will detect if it is being run in the VxStream Sandbox
Look for DLLs associated with function hooking
User-space hooking is a technique used by anti-virus to detect what could be considered malicious behavior. The technique is also used by sandboxes to record a log of runtime behaviors of a process. The most common way of hooking a process is to inject a DLL into the process. This hooking DLL will patch system DLLs like kernel32.dll and ntdll.dll in memory. When the process being hooked makes a call into these system DLLs, it will be redirected to a “detour” function inside of the injected hooking dll. If the function call is determined to be benign, the control flow is allowed to continue into the system DLLs.
Anti-Virus products that utilize this technique tend to prefer hooking system DLLs like kernel32.dll over ntdll.dll. This is because hooking ntdll.dll is less reliable and requires more labor to write. The interface to ntdll.dll could change on the whim of Microsoft, and isn’t documented well. kernel32.dll has a more predictable and constant interface and is well documented on MSDN.
A malicious program wanting to avoid detection at runtime by a user-space hook might have some success calling directly into ntdll.dllinstead of kernel32.dll because the underlying ntdll.dll functions may not be hooked.
The sample will look for injected DLLs associated with user-space hooks in its process space by making a call to ntdll!LdrGetDllHandle()instead of the more common kernel32!GetModuleHandle(). By calling directly into the ntdll implementation, hooks on the kernel32 layer can be avoided. If a DLL associated with hooking is discovered, the programs behavior can be altered to specifically avoid detection by these products.
If a DLL is found, the result is stored so that future malicious functionality can be suppressed, or specific techniques to avoid detection can be utilized.
The hooking DLL black-list:
| DLL File Name | Vendor |
|---|---|
| avcuf32.dll | BitDefender |
| BgAgent.dll | BullGuard |
| guard32.dll | COMODO |
| wl_hook.dll | Agnitum |
| QOEHook.dll | Qurb |
| a2hooks32.dll | Emsisoft |
Looking for Sandbox Artifacts on the File System
If any of this files or directories are found, the process terminates prematurely. These files appear to be associated with sandbox software.
C:\agent\agent.pyw
C:\sandbox\starter.exe
c:\ipf\BDCore_U.dll
C:\cwsandbox_manager
C:\cwsandbox
C:\Stuff\odbg110
C:\gfisandbox
C:\Virus Analysis
C:\iDEFENSE\SysAnalyzer
c:\gnu\bin
C:\SandCastle\tools
C:\cuckoo\dll
C:\MDS\WinDump.exe
C:\tsl\Raptorclient.exe
C:\guest_tools\start.bat
C:\tools\aswsnx\snxcmd.exe
C:\Winap\ckmon.pyw
c:\tools\decodezeus
c:\tools\aswsnx
C:\sandbox\starter.exe
C:\Kit\procexp.exe
c:\tracer\mdare32_0.sys
C:\tool\malmon
C:\Samples\102114\Completed
c:\vmremote\VmRemoteGuest.exe
d:\sandbox_svc.exe
Checking Number of CPU Cores
Remember how the CPUID “Product Brand String” was stored for later use? Here’s why. If the CPU should have more than 1 core, but the operating system only reports 1 core, it’s likely running inside a virtual machine.
A call is made to RtlGetNativeSystemInformation(SystemBasicInformation, ...). This call will fill the contents of a struct SYSTEM\_BASIC\_INFORMATION struct. The sample checks the field \_SYSTEM\_BASIC\_INFORMATION.NumberOfProcessors and if the value is 1 and the CPU Product Brand String reported should have more than one core, the process is terminated.
CPU brand strings that are checked:
'Intel(R) Core(TM) i7'
'Intel(R) Core(TM) i5'
'Intel(R) Core(TM) i3'
'Intel(R) Core(TM)2 Duo CPU'
NtQuerySystemInformation() _SYSTEM_INFORMATION_CLASS enum in ReactOS source RtlGetNativeSystemInformation() seems to be similar to NtQuerySystemInformation() documented on MSDN here.
I found an unofficial source of the struct SYSTEM_BASIC_INFORMATION here: http://masm32.com/board/index.php?topic=3400.0
ReactOS struct _SYSTEM_BASIC_INFORMATION
Yet Another DLL hooking blacklist
These DLLs are associated with software used to manually analyze samples.
dir_watch.dll
tracer.dll
SbieDll.dll
APIOverride.dll
NtHookEngine.dll
api_log.dll
LOG_API.DLL
LOG_API32.DLL
ntdll!LdrGetDllHandle()
If any of these DLLs are loaded, the process terminates.
Kernel Driver Check
ReactOS RtlGetNativeSystemInformation is just NtQuerySystemInformation
ReactOS SystemModuleInformation
A call to ntdll!RtlGetNativeSystemInformation(SystemModuleInformation, ...) is made. This returns a list of all loaded kernel drivers.
Each kernel module is compared to a blacklist that is organized by vendor.
If any of these drivers are found, the process will terminate.
- ???
- taskrun\bruta\kbruta.sys
- taskrun\bruta\TBM.sys
- Sandbox, VM, and SysInternals drivers
- vmx_svga.sys
- vmmouse.sys
- xennet.sys
- CaptureProcessMonitor.sys
- CaptureRegistryMonitor.sys
- CaptureFileMonitor.sys
- CWSandboxWatchdogDri (sic)
- VBoxVideo.sys
If any of the following drivers are found, it is noted in the global struct, for later evasion techniques.
- Quick Heal (Indian)
- bdsnm.sys
- bdsflt.sys
- ggc.sys
- catflt.sys
- wsnf.sys
- llio.sys
- mscank.sys
- EMLTDI.SYS
- ZoneAlarm
- vsdatant.sys
- Qihoo 360 (Chinese)
- 360Box.sys
- 360Box64.sys
- 360Camera.sys
- 360Camera64.sys
- 360SelfProtection.sys
- 360AntiHacker.sys
- 360AntiHacker64.sys
- 360AvFlt.sys
- PC Tools (now part of Norton Security)
- pctNdis.sys
- pctNdisLW64.sys
- Norton 360
- 360AvFlt.sys
- 360FsFlt.sys
- K7 Computing (Indian)
- K7Sentry.sys
- K7FWFilt.sys
- K7TdiHlp.sys
- Trust Port (Czech Republic)
- tpsec.sys
- Privacyware (US)
- pwipf6.sys
- MicroWorld escan (US, India)
- mwfsmflt.sys
- ProcObsrvesx.sys
- bdfsfltr.sys
- econceal.sys
- Filseclab (Chinese)
- ffsmon.sys
- fildds.sys
- filmfd.sys
- filppd.sys
- Kaspersky
- kl1.sys
- klif.sys
- kltdi.sys
- kneps.sys
- klkbdflt.sys
- klmouflt.sys
- G Data (German)
- GDBehave.sys
- GDNdisIc.sys
- gdwfpcd64.sys
- gdwfpcd32.sys
- Arcabit (Polish)
- ABFLT.sys
- Avast (Czech Republic)
- aswMonFlt.sys
- aswRvrt.sys
- aswRdr2.sys
- aswVmm.sys
- aswNdisFlt.sys
- aswSnx.sys
- aswSP.sys
- aswStm.sys
- Avira (German)
- avnetflt.sys
- avkmgr.sys
- avipbb.sys
- avgntflt.sys
- ESET (Slovakia)
- EpfwLWF.sys
- epfwwfp.sys
- eamonm.sys
- ehdrv.sys
- epfw.sys
- eelam.sys
- Baidu (Chinese)
- Bfilter.sys
- Bfmon.sys
- Bhbase.sys
- AVG (Czech Republic)
- avgdiskx.sys
- avgidsdriverlx.sys
- avgtdix.sys
- avgunivx.sys
Anti-Process
This will only execute if something was found in the kernel module check. (???)
The process list is enumerated by calling RtlGetNativeSystemInformation(5)
MSDN SYSTEM_PROCESS_INFORMATION
If a process with this filename is found, its process id is recorded, and later terminated.
This is where the author prepares an attack on the analyst’s psyche. So far, the process only detects sandbox, VM, and antivirus, but this list of tools are usually run manually by an analyst. By detecting their presence but not immediately terminating them, instead delaying the termination until a later part of the process, can give some analyst nightmares.
- apispy.exe
- autoruns.exe
- autorunsc.exe
- dumpcap.exe
- emul.exe
- fortitracer.exe
- hookanaapp.exe
- hookexplorer.exe
- idag.exe
- idaq.exe
- importrec.exe
- imul.exe
- joeboxcontrol.exe
- joeboxserver.exe
- multi_pot.exe
- ollydbg.exe
- peid.exe
- petools.exe
- proc_analyzer.exe
- procexp.exe
- procmon.exe
- regmon.exe
- scktool.exe
- sniff_hit.exe
- sysanalyzer.exe
- vmsrvc.exe
- vmtoolsd.exe
- vmusrvc.exe
- vmwaretray.exe
For each process, a call to QueryFullProcessImageNameW() is made and compared against a second blacklist. If any string in the blacklist occurs in the full image name, the process terminates.
THESE AREN’T SANDBOXES OR A/V, ARE THEY????
- \oracle\product\
- \OraHome_1\perl\
- \dbhome_1\perl\bin
- \ZKTeco\ZKAccess\
- \oracle\FRHome_1\perl\
- \Oracle\Middleware\
Is File Name [hash].exe Check
In the Anti-Virus industry, it is extreamly common to rename a sample’s filename to its hash value. This is done to easily identify a sample, and to store it with a unique filename. Typical hash algorithms that are used are MD5, SHA-1, and SHA-256.
This sample will read itself off of the disk, then calculate its checksum. Then it will see if the hex-string of the checksum is found in its filename.
Is VMware Tools Installed Check
Next, the sample checks if these two directories exist. If either exist, the process is terminated.
- C:\Program Files\VMware\VMware Tools
- C:\Program Files (x86)\VMware\VMware Tools
Hard Disk Vendor Check
The children of these two registry keys are enumerated:
- \Registry\Machine\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\IDE
- \Registry\Machine\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\SCSI
The values are check against a blacklist containing virtualized hard disk vendors.
- QEMU_
- VMware
- Ven_Red_Hat&Prod_VirtIO
- DiskVBOX
- DiskVirtual
If a value is found in the blacklist, the process is terminated.
Misc Hardware Vendors and BIOS Checks
These hardware specific registry keys are check. If they exist, the process terminates.
- \Registry\Machine\HARDWARE\ACPI\DSDT\VBOX__\VBOXBIOS
- \Registry\Machine\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\ACPI\Hyper_V_Gen_Counter_V1
- \Registry\Machine\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\ACPI\XEN0000
- \Registry\Machine\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\XENBUS\CLASS_VBD&REV_02
In the same function, \Registry\Machine\HARDWARE\DESCRIPTION\System\ is queried and checked against this blacklist:
- SystemBiosVersion
- ‘BOCHS – 1’
- ‘VBOX – 1’
- ‘PRLS – 1’
- VideoBiosVersion
- ‘VirtualBox’
If any of these registry keys match, the process is terminated.
Anti Network Interface Card (NIC) Check
This check is skipped if kernel modules associated with “Privacyware” where detected. I’m assuming “Privacyware” detects the API calls in this check as malicious.
This function check the NICs that are installed, and calls to IPHLPAPI!GetAdaptersInfo()
Meeting these condition will cause a premature termination.
- Realtek RTL8139 Family PCI Fast Ethernet NIC
- also username is ‘antonie’
- also ‘c:\downloads\’ exists
- Realtek RTL8139C+ Fast Ethernet NIC
- also username is ‘Antony’
- also ‘c:\downloads\’ exists
These network cards will get terminated out-right:
- VMware Accelerated AMD PCNet Adapter
- Microsoft Virtual Machine Bus Network Adapter
- Microsoft Hyper-V Network Adapter
- Adaptador de red de bus de m?quina virtual de Microsoft
If the network card is NOT one of these, it will check the MAC address:
- VMware Virtual Ethernet Adapter for VMnet8
- VMware Virtual Ethernet Adapter for VMnet1
- VirtualBox Host-Only Ethernet Adapter
These MAC addresses will result in a premature termination:
| MAC address | OUI Information | Notes |
|---|---|---|
00:01:02:03:04:xx |
3COM | defunt, obvious bogus mac address |
00:03:FF:xx:xx:xx |
Microsoft Corporation | doesn’t make physical hardware? |
00:0C:29:xx:xx:xx |
VMware, Inc. | |
08:00:27:xx:xx:xx |
VirtualBox | |
00:07:e9:e4:ce:4d |
Intel | 0 results on google |
00:30:18:ab:d7:f2 |
Jetway Information Co., Ltd. | 0 results on google |
00:ff:f2:f8:30:xx |
Dell?? VirtualBox?? | |
00:50:56:xx:xx:xx |
VMware, Inc. | |
52:54:00:12:34:56 |
Realtek | copypasta QEMU startup script? |
00:1c:42:xx:xx:xx |
Parallels, Inc. | VMware product |
00:15:5d:xx:xx:xx |
Microsoft Corporation | |
00:1d:d8:xx:xx:xx |
Microsoft Corporation |
I would like to know who owns the “00:07:e9:e4:ce:4d” and “00:30:18:ab:d7:f2”. If they are burnt onto a physical device, it’s either a development machine, or a targeted machine to be specifically avoided.
Window Title Check
Pairs of window class names and titles are check for, and if one is found, the samples’s process is terminated prematurely. These tools are used by analysts and some are used by sandboxes.
| Window Class | Window Title |
|---|---|
| PROCEXPL | sysinternals |
| PROCMON_WINDOW_CLASS | sysinternals |
| Autoruns | sysinternals |
| TCPViewClass | sysinternals |
| 0 | TCPView – Sysinternals: www.sysinternals.com |
| 0 | File Monitor – Sysinternals: www.sysinternals.com |
| 0 | Registry Monitor – Sysinternals: www.sysinternals.com |
| 0 | Process Monitor – Sysinternals: www.sysinternals.com |
| gdkWindowToplevel | Wireshark |
| API_TRACE_MAIN | 0 |
| 0 | Wget [100%%] http://tristan.ssdcorp.net/guid |
| 0 | C:\Program Files\Wireshark\dumpcap.exe |
| 0 | C:\wireshark\dumpcap.exe |
| 0 | C:\SandCastle\tools\FakeServer.exe |
| 0 | C:\Python27\python.exe |
| 0 | start.bat – C:\Manual\auto.bat |
| 0 | Fortinet Sunbox |
| 0 | PEiD v0.95 |
| 0 | Total Commander 7.0 – Ahnlab Inc. |
| 0 | Total Commander 6.53 – GRISOFT, s.r.o. |
| 0 | Total Commander 7.56a – Avira Soft |
| 0 | Total Commander 7.56a – ROKURA SRL |
| 0 | C:\strawberry\perl\bin\perl.exe |
| ThunderRT6FormDC | SysAnalyzer |
| TfrmMain | All-Seeing Eye |
| Afx:400000:b:10011:6:350167 | Malicious Code Monitor v1.7.6 For NT(x86) – ([email protected]) |
| TApplication | Mouse Move – by RJL Software, Inc. |
| SmartSniff | SmartSniff |
| ConsoleWindowClass | VxStream Kernel Service Manager |
| Registry Key | Notes |
|---|---|
| \Registry\Machine\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\Iris Network Traffic Analyzer | |
| \Registry\Machine\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\InstallWatch Pro 2.5 | |
| \Registry\Machine\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\SysAnalyzer_is1 | |
| \Registry\Machine\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall{13BE68B1-7498-48AB-9D22-AD3AB6532531} | API Monitor v2 Alpha |
| \Registry\Machine\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\Oracle VM VirtualBox Guest Additions | |
| \Registry\Machine\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\Oracle VM VirtualBox Guest Additions | |
| \Registry\Machine\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\PCI\VEN_80EE&DEV_BEEF&SUBSYS_00000000&REV_00 | VirtualBox Graphics Device Drivers |
| \Registry\Machine\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\PCI\VEN_80EE&DEV_CAFE&SUBSYS_00000000&REV_00 | VirtualBox Guest Service Device Drivers |
| \Registry\Machine\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\PCI\VEN_5333&DEV_8811&SUBSYS_00000000&REV_00 | S3 Video Card (used by virtual machines) |
| \Registry\Machine\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\PCI\VEN_1AB8&DEV_4005&SUBSYS_04001AB8&REV_00 | Parallels Display WDDM Device Drivers |
| \Registry\Machine\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\PCI\VEN_1AB8&DEV_4000&SUBSYS_04001AB8&REV_00 | Parallels Tool Device Drivers |
| \Registry\Machine\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Enum\PCI\VEN_1AB8&DEV_4006&SUBSYS_04061AB8&REV_00 | Parallels Memory Controller |
| \Registry\Machine\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall{25AD16E5-F48B-4455-83D7-849D600475A4} | Winalysis WindowexeAllkiller ? |
| \Registry\Machine\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\Iris Network Traffic Analyzer | |
| \Registry\Machine\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\SysAnalyzer_is1 | |
| \Registry\Machine\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall\InstallWatch Pro 2.5 | |
| \Registry\Machine\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall{13BE68B1-7498-48AB-9D22-AD3AB6532531} | API Monitor v2 Alpha |
| \Registry\Machine\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Uninstall{25AD16E5-F48B-4455-83D7-849D600475A4} | Winalysis WindowexeAllkiller ? |
VMXh VMWare Check
The sample checks for the presence of VMware, by trying to execute a Intel IN instruction with EAX set to the value ‘VMXh’. The IN instruction is a privileged instruction, and outside of the VMware guest, would result in a General Protection Fault exception. But inside a VMWare guest, the fault is not generated. VMWare uses this as a way for its guest software to communicate to the host. It is documented here.
The specific technique to detect VMWare is here.
This is how the sample implements the check:
Because this portion must be written in assembly, I assume the NOPs are to thwart any static detection on the opcodes.
Direct3D Video Card Check
Using the Direct3D interface, the sample is able to enumerate information about the installed video adapters. If the video cards are vendors are in the blacklist, the process prematurely terminates.
Vendor Blacklist:
| VendorID | Vendor Name | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| 0x15ad | VMWare Inc. | |
| 0x80ee | Oracle Corp. | Virtual Box |
| 0x1013 | Cirrus Logic | Bochs and QEMU |
Vendor Whitelist:
| VendorID | Vendor Name |
|---|---|
| 0x8086 | Intel |
| 0x10de | Nvidia |
| 0x1002 | AMD |
Now, because there is a whitelist and a blacklist, there exists a possibility that the device was not in either list. In the event of this case, the tie is settled by calling GetCursorPosition(). If there are 15 mouse movements, then the sample assumes that it is not in a sandbox, and continues execution. If there isn’t 15 mouse movements, the sample just blocks, waiting for the movements to occur. During this waiting period, the .data section is re-encrypted. If the sample where in a sandbox, it would be stuck in this loop, waiting. When the sandbox times-out, it might dump the contents of memory. By re-encrypting the .data section, it will be encrypted in the data dump.
A common feature of sandboxes is a “mouse mover.” The mouse mouse mover will make an application think there is a user on the workspace by moving the mouse cursor around.
The sample also utilizes direct system calls to make the call to GetCursorPosition(). This technique will bypass any user-space hooks that might try to move the mouse automatically.
Native Application Binary
The beginning of this binary has many anti-VM and anti-sandboxing techniques. just like the previous binary. It also allocates a large struct containing function pointers like the previous binary.
This portion of the sample is encrypted and compressed in the .data segment. As mentioned before, it written to disk in a NTFS ADS and at boot time before all the windows subsystems are loaded. If you have ever upgraded to windows 2000, you will remember that the installation could upgrade the filesystem from FAT 32 to NTFS. This portion of the sample runs at the same point as the file system upgrade code would run.
An example project using this technique can be found on codeproject.com
The Native binary is written in the same style as the parent. A large struct is allocated on the heap that stores function pointers. It also uses RC4 to encrypt its string literals, and contains the final payload compressed using aplib.
The goal of this portion of the sample is to remove a large number of anti-virus software. It will also modify the host used by the DNS client. There are many records for anti-virus update servers that get set to 0.0.0.0, effectively stoping any view anti-virus installed from being able to update its definitions.
It finishes by dropping the final payload to %SystemRoot%\rdpinst.exe and ensuring that it runs later in boot-up by setting a registry value in\Registry\Machine\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\RunOnce.
Final Payload
The payload shares some similarities with the other binaries, but unlike the past two, it doesn’t allocate a large struct and fill it with function pointers.
The final payload collects recon from the infected machine and reports back to its C2 server over HTTP.
One unique feature of all the traffic collected is that the HTTP host field is always nullptr.
Sample Information
Sha-256: 766e49811c0bb7cce217e72e73a6aa866c15de0ba11d7dda3bd7e9ec33ed6963
* `638d549a24bb0a28e462c70880bf3f979f137cc6`: Main Sample
* `ce0633d8be65202870e7b916e7bec5a0218cbbbb`: Packed Native API Application binary
* 14598af84ee2dbd88d3fff0b60aba829a412dfbe3`: Packed rdpinst.exe (payload)
* `643b295ee6985251d771b7962f2b2fc69e36f5c2`: Packed UAC bypass dll
* `c803eb5e8a4a4e31e8168557d82ff54d68f3832d`: Packed 64-bit CVE-2014-4113 exploit
If you would like to learn more about this specific attack and how you can prevent it, contact us and we’d be happy to advise on a one-to-one basis.
