CVE-2025-69784: OpenEDR Privilege Escalation Vulnerability

CVE-2025-69784 Overview

CVE-2025-69784 is a local privilege escalation vulnerability affecting OpenEDR 2.5.1.0. A local, non-privileged attacker can abuse a vulnerable IOCTL interface exposed by the OpenEDR kernel driver to modify the DLL injection path used by the product. By redirecting this path to a user-writable location, an attacker can cause OpenEDR to load an attacker-controlled DLL into high-privilege processes. This results in arbitrary code execution with SYSTEM privileges, leading to full compromise of the affected system.

Critical Impact

This vulnerability allows local attackers to escalate privileges to SYSTEM level by weaponizing the EDR solution itself, effectively turning a security tool into an attack vector for complete system compromise.

Affected Products

• OpenEDR 2.5.1.0

Discovery Timeline

• 2026-03-16 - CVE-2025-69784 published to NVD
• 2026-03-17 - Last updated in NVD database

Technical Details for CVE-2025-69784

Vulnerability Analysis

This vulnerability represents a critical flaw in the OpenEDR kernel driver's IOCTL interface implementation. The driver exposes an interface that allows modification of the DLL injection path without proper privilege validation. When an attacker sends a crafted IOCTL request to the driver, they can redirect the path where OpenEDR looks for DLLs to inject into monitored processes.

The core issue lies in the driver's failure to properly validate the caller's privileges before allowing modifications to security-critical configuration parameters. Since OpenEDR operates with SYSTEM privileges and performs DLL injection into high-privilege processes as part of its monitoring capabilities, controlling the injection path grants an attacker the ability to execute arbitrary code in those privileged contexts.

This vulnerability is classified under CWE-427 (Uncontrolled Search Path Element), as the root cause involves the application searching for and loading DLLs from a path that can be controlled by an unprivileged user.

Root Cause

The vulnerability stems from insufficient access control in the OpenEDR kernel driver's IOCTL handler. The driver fails to implement proper authorization checks when processing requests to modify the DLL injection path configuration. This design flaw allows any local user to interact with the IOCTL interface and alter critical security parameters that should only be modifiable by privileged users or system administrators.

The lack of input validation on the path parameter also contributes to the vulnerability, as the driver accepts and stores paths pointing to user-writable directories without verification that the target location is appropriately secured.

Attack Vector

The attack requires local access to the target system. An attacker with a low-privileged user account can exploit this vulnerability through the following attack flow:

1. The attacker identifies the vulnerable IOCTL code exposed by the OpenEDR kernel driver
2. Using a crafted application, the attacker sends an IOCTL request to modify the DLL injection path
3. The attacker sets the path to point to a user-writable directory (e.g., a subdirectory in their user profile)
4. The attacker places a malicious DLL at the specified location
5. When OpenEDR next performs DLL injection into a SYSTEM-level process, it loads the attacker's malicious DLL
6. The attacker's code executes with SYSTEM privileges, achieving full system compromise

Technical details and proof-of-concept information can be found in the GitHub Issue #49 Discussion and the Scavenger Security Blog Post. Additional code references are available in the GitHub Gist Code Snippet.

Detection Methods for CVE-2025-69784

Indicators of Compromise

• Unexpected IOCTL requests to the OpenEDR kernel driver from non-administrative processes
• Modification of OpenEDR's DLL injection path configuration in system registry or driver state
• DLL files appearing in user-writable directories that are referenced by OpenEDR processes
• SYSTEM-level processes loading DLLs from unusual or user-writable paths

Detection Strategies

• Monitor for DeviceIoControl API calls targeting OpenEDR's kernel driver device object from low-privilege processes
• Implement integrity monitoring on OpenEDR configuration parameters, particularly paths related to DLL injection
• Deploy behavioral detection rules to identify privilege escalation patterns where user-mode processes manipulate kernel driver configurations
• Audit loaded modules in SYSTEM processes for DLLs originating from non-standard system paths

Monitoring Recommendations

• Enable verbose logging for OpenEDR driver operations to capture IOCTL requests and configuration changes
• Implement file integrity monitoring on directories commonly used for DLL sideloading attacks
• Configure endpoint detection to alert on unexpected module loads in protected SYSTEM processes
• Monitor Windows Event logs for suspicious process creation events following driver configuration modifications

How to Mitigate CVE-2025-69784

Immediate Actions Required

• Review and restrict access to the OpenEDR driver device object using appropriate security descriptors
• Audit systems for signs of exploitation, including unusual DLLs in user-writable directories
• Consider temporarily disabling OpenEDR's DLL injection functionality until a patch is available
• Implement application control policies to prevent unauthorized DLL loading in SYSTEM processes

Patch Information

Consult the OpenEDR Official Website and the GitHub ComodoSecurity Project for official security updates and patch availability. Monitor the GitHub Issue #49 Discussion for vendor response and remediation guidance.

Workarounds

• Implement strict ACLs on the OpenEDR driver device object to limit IOCTL access to SYSTEM and administrators only
• Deploy application whitelisting solutions to prevent execution of unauthorized DLLs in high-privilege processes
• Use Windows Defender Application Control (WDAC) or similar to enforce code integrity policies
• Consider network segmentation to limit lateral movement if exploitation occurs

# Example: Restrict device object access (PowerShell)
# Note: Specific implementation depends on driver device name
# Consult OpenEDR documentation for proper configuration
icacls "C:\Program Files\OpenEDR" /inheritance:d /grant:r "SYSTEM:(OI)(CI)F" /grant:r "Administrators:(OI)(CI)F"